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ABSTRACT
The assessment of new vulnerabilities is an activity that accounts
for information from several data sources and produces a ‘severity’
score for the vulnerability. The CommonVulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem (CVSS) is the reference standard for this assessment. Yet, no
guidance currently exists on which information aids a correct as-
sessment and should therefore be considered. In this paper we ad-
dress this problem by evaluating which information cues increase
(or decrease) assessment accuracy.We devise a block design experi-
ment with 67 software engineering students with varying vulnera-
bility information andmeasure scoring accuracy under different in-
formation sets.We find that baseline vulnerability descriptions pro-
vided by standard vulnerability sources provide only part of the in-
formation needed to achieve an accurate vulnerability assessment.
Further, we find that additional information on assets, attacks,
and vulnerability type contributes in increasing the accuracy
of the assessment; conversely, information on known threatsmis-
leads the assessor and decreases assessment accuracy and should
be avoided when assessing vulnerabilities. These results go in the
direction of formalizing the vulnerability communication to, for
example, fully automate security assessments.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Vulnerability management; • Soft-
ware and its engineering → Risk management; • General
and reference→ Empirical studies;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Addressing software vulnerabilities is an important process in any
software development project [17] to maintain software quality
and mitigate risk of attack for the users. Several standards, such
as PCI-DSS for the management of credit card information and
NIST’s SCAP protocol (adopted for example by the U.S. DoD direc-
tive 8500.01), require the use of the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System [12], CVSS, as the metric of choice for vulnerability mea-
surement and prioritisation [1, 25]. The CVSS specification [12] de-
scribes a framework that the assessor follows to transform infor-
mation about the vulnerability into a CVSS score, and provides a
number of ‘dimensions’ or ‘metrics’ over which the assessor per-
forms his or her evaluation. For example, the assessor may evalu-
ate that the vulnerability can be remotely accessed, and assign a
Network value to the CVSS metric Attack Vector; similarly, he
or she may conclude that a successful attack requires the victim
user to perform specific actions for the attack to be successful, and
assign a Required value to the CVSS metric User Interaction.
The result of these assessments depends strongly on what in-
formation on the vulnerability is available to the assessor. Notably,
this information may vary substantially, ranging from general de-
scriptions such as “Unspecified vulnerability in [..] allows local users
to affect availability via vectors related to Kernel”,1 to more techni-
cally detailed information [6]. Whereas the type of information
one can gather generally covers type of vulnerability, attack pro-
cedure, and existence of threats [14], no guidance currently ex-
ists on the mapping of which information should be considered
when performing an assessment over the CVSS metrics. For exam-
ple, analysing the attack proceduremay provide details on the posi-
tion of the attacker w.r.t. the vulnerable software component (cap-
tured by the Attack Vector CVSSmetric), but may not reveal use-
ful information to evaluate which privileges are required to exploit
the vulnerability (captured by the Privileges Required metric).
This prevents the development and use of automatic tools that can
provide useful summaries of available information that the asses-
sor can use when performing his or her CVSS evaluation of the
vulnerability.
In this study we evaluate which information cues can aid the
vulnerability assessment process as guided by the CVSS standard,
and should therefore be readily provided to the assessor. This pa-
per’s contributions can be summarized as follows:
1https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-5469
(1) Following guidelines from current standards [20] and re-
cent literature [14, 26], we identify four information cate-
gories over which vulnerabilities are described: Assets [29],
Attack [26], Vulnerability type [20], and Known threats [14].
(2) Building on recent research on the automatic identification
of ‘requirement smells’ [10], we evaluate the number of in-
formation cues (i.e. phrases consisting of one or more words)
associatedwith each of the identified information categories,
and their affect on assessment error.
(3) We ask 67 students to score a set of 16 vulnerabilities using
CVSS. To evaluate the effect of different information cues,
we devise a block experiment design in which each student
is assigned randomly to a treatment2 group, and compare
assessment errors to identify which information cues are
effective in aiding the final assessment and which are not.
This paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 outlines our research goal and questions, experiment
setup, metrics, and hypotheses. We then presents our results (Sec-
tion 4) and discuss their implications (Section 5). Section 6 and 7
discusses threats to validity and conclude.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In security engineering controlled experiments have been performed
to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of vulnerability analy-
sis techniques and applications [3, 4, 27], security patterns in help-
ing software designers [32], and the application of different secu-
rity methods for risk assessment [21].
Similarly, several authors studied the relation between vulner-
ability measures and risk scenarios. The operative aspects inte-
grating security measures in production environments have been
studied, among others, by Dashevskyi et al. [7] (who investigate
settings where vulnerabilities are included in third party compo-
nents), Zhang et al. [33] (who predict bug fixing times by employ-
ing a Markov model based on field data), Zimmermann et al. [35]
(who investigate the discrepancies between user-supplied bug in-
formation and information needed by the developers), and Zhao et
al. [34] (who evaluate the effect of early discussion on bug fixing).
We integrate these findings by focusing on vulnerability informa-
tion and evaluating which information aids the vulnerability fixing
process.
Proposed measures for the identification of vulnerabilities in
code rely on features of code such as code complexity and code
churn [28], whereas other authors propose keyword-based text-
mining procedures to forecast vulnerabilities [31]. Thompson et
al. [30] investigated the cognitive effort spent when breaking down
software engineering tasks such as bug fixing.
To aid a correct understanding of software requirements, nat-
ural language processing techniques such as keyword extraction
have been used to detect quality defects in natural language spec-
ification [10]. Experimentation often relates to factors such as the
correctness and the positive or negative tone of requirements [22],
and grammatical features such as passive or active voice require-
ments. While our approach is similar, we detect information cues
2Treatments integrate baseline vulnerability descriptions with information provided
by the standard body for CVSS.
in vulnerability description text to associate it with assessment er-
rors, as opposed to measuring ‘bad wording’ in software require-
ments.
2.1 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System
The CVSS framework specification is the worldwide standard for
vulnerability assessment and has been drafted by the dedicated
First.org Special Interest Group (SIG). The CVSS framework pro-
vides a number of dimensions over which a vulnerability is as-
sessed based on available information on the vulnerability. These
dimensions are classified into three groups, ormetrics: Base Metric
(captures technical characteristics of the vulnerability), Temporal
Metric (captures vulnerable conditions that change in time), and
Environmental Metric (captures conditions that change by deploy-
ment environments). The Base Metric Group is by far the most
commonly used in practice [16, 23] and is the one officially used to
describe vulnerabilities in the NIST’s National Vulnerability Data-
base (NVD) [2].
The Base Score assessment is organized in two conceptually dif-
ferent groups of sub-metrics 3; Exploitability metrics reflect the
means bywhich an attacker can deliver a successful attack, whereas
Impactmetrics provide an assessment of the consequences of a suc-
cessful attack on the impacted system.
Exploitability metrics under CVSS v3 are measured over four di-
mensions: Attack Vector (AV), Attack Complexity (AC), Privileges
Required (PR) and User Interaction (UI). Impact metrics in CVSS
v3 are measured over the triad Confidentiality, Integrity and Avail-
ability. Table 1 provides a summary description of the CVSS v3 Base
metrics. Full reference can be found at the official First.org specifi-
cation documentation [12].
2.2 Information categories for vulnerability
measurement
We evaluate the effect of the following information categories on
the accuracy of CVSS assessments:
Assets. Security assessment and management standards such
as NIST 800-30 and Common Criteria [19, 29] define the concept of
‘asset’ as key to correctly evaluate the severity of the vulnerability
impact. Information in this category includes details on type of
affected system (e.g. a server or a client) or the component affected
by the vulnerability (e.g. an operating system or a virtual machine).
Attack. Expert interviews conducted by Holm et al. [14], along-
side other studies [13], identify information regarding attack pro-
cedures as important to conduct an accurate vulnerability assess-
ment. Attack procedures describe the actions that an attacker must
perform to exploit the vulnerability: for example, the attacker may
need to launch aman-in-the-middle attack, or inject code in a web-
page.
Vulnerability type. ISO 29147 [20] conceptualizes vulnerabil-
ity information as related to a description of the vulnerability and
its impact. This includes information on the type of vulnerability
and its causes in the program’s code. For example, an erroneous
3A third metric group, Scope, is not reported here for brevity as it is not used in this
study.
Table 1: Summary description of CVSS v3 Base metrics
Exploitability metrics
ID Metric Description Values
AV Attack
Vector
Reflects how remote the attacker
can be, to deliver the attack
against the vulnerable component.
The more remote, the higher the
score.
Physical,
Local,
Adj. Net.,
Network.
AC Attack
Complexity
Reflects the existence of condi-
tions that are beyond the at-
tacker’s control for the attack to be
successful.
High, Low.
PR Privileges
Required
Reflects the privileges the attacker
need have on the vulnerable sys-
tem to exploit the vulnerable com-
ponent.
High, Low,
None.
UI User
Interaction
Reflects the need for user interac-
tion to deliver a successful attack.
Required,
None.
Impact metrics
ID Metric Description Values
C Confidentiality Measures the impact to the confi-
dentiality of information.
None, Low,
High.
I Integrity Measures the impact to the in-
tegrity of information.
None, Low,
High.
A Availability Measures the impact to the avail-
ability of the impacted compo-
nent.
None, Low,
High.
bound checking of a memory array may lead to memory corrup-
tion vulnerabilities; similarly, erroneous input validation on a web
form may lead to cross-site-scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
Known threat. Several studies [5, 14, 26] suggest that informa-
tion on existing threats should also be provided to aid a better vul-
nerability assessment. This information includes details on the ex-
istence of proof-of-concept exploit (PoC), active exploitation in the
wild, or incidents linked to the specific vulnerability.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this paper, following the discussion in Sec. 2.2, we investigate
the following research question: How does information on {Asset,
Attack, Vuln. type, Known threat} impact assessment errors?
3.1 Experimental settings
To address these four research questions, we perform an experi-
ment where subjects are asked to score sixteen vulnerabilities us-
ing CVSS. Each vulnerability is associated with its description from
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)[2] and a treatment con-
sisting of additional information on the vulnerability (on top of its
baseline NVD description) provided by the CVSS SIG [11]. Table 2
reports example vulnerability descriptions and treatments used for
the experiment. The column ‘Treatment effect’ reports the effect
of the treatment on the accuracy of the assessment, which is dis-
cussed in detail in Section 4.
Subjects were given 90 minutes to complete the assessment ir-
respective of the treatment selection. Hence, each subject had on
average about 6 minutes per vulnerability. In accordance with liter-
ature on the subject [24], the time was selected on the basis of pre-
vious trial experiments previously conducted in similar settings.
3.2 Vulnerabilities and Subject Selection
The sixteen vulnerabilities employed in the experiment are obtained
from the official CVSS v3 Example document drafted by the First.org
SIG for CVSS [11]. The vulnerabilities included by the SIG have
been chosen to represent the full set of CVSS metrics, and are
actively used for training purposes by members of the SIG con-
sortium within the respective organizations. Each vulnerability in
the document is associated with its official public description from
theNational Vulnerability Database [2] and additional information
added by the CVSS SIG. The subjects of this study are 67 students
enrolled in the software engineering study program, who regis-
tered for a software security course.
3.3 Measures
Information cues. To quantify the amount of information in a
vulnerability description (for each information category identified
in Sec. 2.2: Asset, Attack, Vulnerability type, Known threat)
we employ a methodology originally developed to automatically
identify ‘smells’ in software requirement specifications [10]. The
original methodologyemploys keyword-matching to identify standard-
defined criteria for quality of requirements in the analysed text. As
no such standard exists for software vulnerability descriptions, in
our study we identify keywords relevant to each of the identified
information categories by manually analysing over 100 randomly
sampled vulnerabilities from NVD. Keywords are selected as indi-
cators of what information is present in the description. For ex-
ample, the keyword ‘remote attacker’ indicates that the vulnerabil-
ity description explicitly reports information relative to the infor-
mation category Attacker. Information cues are measured as the
number of keyword matches in a baseline vulnerability descrip-
tion and in the corresponding treatment. Table 3 reports a sample
of the keywords identified for each information category. The full
keyword list is available in the online appendix.4
Assessment errors. To evaluate assessment errors, we compare
the subjects’ CVSS assessments on the vulnerabilities with those
performed by the CVSS SIG. In this study we do not consider mag-
nitude or directionality of error, but only the presence of a correct
(error = 0) or wrong (error = 1) assessment for each CVSS metric
(AV, AC, UI, PR, C, I, A), for all vulnerabilities.
Subject characteristics. Each subject was asked to complete a
background questionnaire. We collected data relative to: security
expertise of the student; software engineering expertise; years of
prior work experience; years of enrollment in a Computer Science
major; university courses completed. Students where asked to per-
form both a self-assessment on their expertise and to answer a set
of multiple-choice technical questions on relevant areas of soft-
ware security and engineering. Each technical question has only
4https://github.com/tum-i22/information-cues
Table 2: Example of vulnerability descriptions and treatments given to the students.
Example of four CVE descriptions and treatments assigned to students. We obtained this descriptions from the NVD. Treatment are obtained from
the official CVSSv3 example guide [11]. The column ‘Treatment effect’ outlines the effect on error rate of the treatment. Indicated p-values are Holm-
corrected for multiple comparisons over CVSS metrics. We highlighted in bold relevant excerpts that explain the treatment effect. Significance of the
treatment effect is evaluated with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
CVE NVD Description Treatment Treatment effect
CVE-2014-3566 The SSL protocol 3.0, as used in OpenSSL through
1.0.1i and other products, uses nondeterministic CBC
padding, which makes it easier for man in the middle
attackers to obtain plaintext data via a padding- ora-
cle attack, aka the "POODLE" issue.
A typical treatment is that a victim has visited
a web server and her web browser now con-
tains a cookie that an attacke wishes to steal. For
a successful attack, the attacker must be able
to modify network traffic between the victim
and this web server, and both victim and system
must be willing to use SSL 3.0 for encryption.
Decrease error on AC
(p < 0.10)
Decrease error on UI
(p < 0.01)
CVE-2012-0384 Cisco IOS 12.2 through 12.4 and [..] before 3.2.2SG,
whenAAA authorization is enabled, allow remote au-
thenticated users to bypass intended access restric-
tions and execute commands via a (1) HTTP or (2)
HTTPS session, aka Bug ID CSCtr91106.
This vulnerability is post authentication on
the administrative interface of the Cisco de-
vice. Therefore to attack a typical installation, the
attacker would need access to the trusted / internal
side of the IOS.
Increase error on PR
(p < 0.01)
Table 3: Definitions of information categories and selection of respective keywords.
Information cate-
gories
Definition Reference Keywords
Asset Assets are entities that users or
vendors value and contain vul-
nerabilities.
[12, 18, 29] hardware, guest virtual machine, host, vm, device, client, server, operating sys-
tem, version, product, affected version, affected product, vulnerable, vulnerable
software, vulnerable hardware, affected software, affected hardware, software
Attack Actions and entities that can ad-
versely act on assets by exploit-
ing vulnerabilities.
[5, 14, 26] attacker, malicious user, remote authenticated user, remote user, man in the
middle, unauthenticated remote attacker, spoofing, inject code, manipulate
pointers, cache poisoning, open malicious file, birthday attack
Vulnerability
type
Describes the technical flaws
that can be exploited and the
impact of the exploitation.
[20] improper bounds checking, insufficient randomness, memory corruption,
buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, broken authentication, insecure crypto-
graphic storage, failure to restrict URL access, cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
Known threat Describe known threats that
can exploit the vulnerability
[5, 14] known threats, threat, known attacks, information about known threats, ex-
ploit, proof-of-concept, incident activity, incident, known incident
one correct answer. The questionnaire is available in the online
appendix. Results are discussed in Section 4.1.
3.4 Hypotheses
Asset. Because Asset provides information regarding the tar-
get of the attack (e.g. a browser, or a server) we expect this informa-
tion category to reduce error assessments on the impact metrics C,
I and A. For example, an attack on a browser may violate the Con-
fidentiality of information stored in cookies or browsing history,
whereas an attack on a server may affect the service Availability.
We formulate the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. H0: The Asset information category does not re-
duce error rates for the C, I, A metrics.
Attack. Information on Attack adds details on the actions that
the attacker has to perform to exploit the vulnerability. Therefore,
we expect this information category to reduce assessment error for
the AV metric (position of the attacker with respect to the vulner-
able component), and the AC metric (reflecting conditions outside
of the attacker control). Additionally, indications on the attacker
actions may give significant indications for the impact of the vul-
nerability. For example, performing a cache poisoning attack5 has
clear repercussions on C and I. Denial of service attacks may indi-
cate losses on A. We formulate the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. H0: The Attack information category does not
reduce error rates for the AV, AC, C, I, A metrics.
Vulnerability type. Information on Vulnerability type
provides information on the complexity of an attack, e.g. by spec-
ifying that the vulnerability is due to insufficient randomness in a
specific variable. Information regarding specific vulnerability types
(e.g. cross-site-scripting vulnerabilities) and required authentica-
tion levels give information on PR and UI. We formulate the fol-
lowing null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. H0: The Vulnerability type information cate-
gory does not reduce error rates for the AC, PR, UI metrics.
5A cache poisoning attack requires the attacker to modify some cached record (e.g.
a DNS response) such that at the next request the victim will receive the counterfeit
information added by the attacker. This may lead to spoofing attacks with possible
losses on at least Confidentiality and Integrity.
Known threat. From the CVSS specification, the Base Metric
should only consider information relative to the technical charac-
teristics of the vulnerability. Specifically, Known threat informa-
tion may be relevant in subsequent assessments to evaluate risk
of attack (e.g. involving the CVSS temporal metrics [12]), but may
confuse the baseline assessment of the vulnerability. For example,
Known threat information may increase error on AC as the exis-
tence of known threats may suggest that the vulnerability can be
easily exploited, e.g. building up on the existing PoC. Similarly, in-
formation on known attacks may influence impact assessments to
reflect those of the known incidents. Therefore, we expect Known
threat to be generally detrimental to the assessment of AC and
C,I,A. We formulate the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. H0: The Known threat information category does
not increase error rates for the AC, C, I, A metrics.
3.5 Experimental procedure
Before the experiment subjects were given a lecture on vulnera-
bility assessment with CVSS. The lecture covered all aspects of the
standard required for the experiment.With the objective of increas-
ing subject’s confidence in the procedure, a demo session scoring
five vulnerabilities from the CVSS documentation (not included in
the experiment) was performed during the lecture.
Subjects were given a handout with the official CVSS specifica-
tion, and a printout spreadsheet containing the sixteen vulnerabil-
ity descriptions. Subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment
group and received additional information on each vulnerability
together with the NVD description. Subjects had to 1) complete
the questionnaire described in Sec. 3.3; 2) read each vulnerability
description; 3) indicate which value for each of the CVSS metrics
in Tab. 1 better reflect the vulnerability description.
3.6 Analysis procedure
To test our hypotheses we employ a set of multilevel mixed effect
regression models of the form:yms,c = Zsβ1+Xcβ2+us +vc +ϵ
m
s,c ,
where yms,c reflects the presence or absence (y
m
s,c ∈ {1, 0}) of an as-
sessment error on themetricm ∈ {AV, AC, UI, PR, C, I, A} by student
s , over vulnerability c; Zs is the control vector of subject character-
istics, and Xc is the vector of information cues for each category
measured on vulnerability c . The remaining terms account for ran-
dom effects for the first level in the hierarchy, students (us ); and
the second, vulnerability (vc ). Each hypothesis is evaluated in ac-
cordance with the respective coefficient sign and its significance.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Overview of subjects
Before executing the experiment, we asked students to fill out a
questionnaire that provides an overview of their background (twenty
multiple-choice questions) and relevant security and software en-
gineering expertise (six self-assessment questions and six techni-
cal questions). All questions where divided in security and software
engineering questions. From the 67 participants, 14 were Bachelor
students, the rest were Master students. 36% of the participants
have part-time work occupations. Looking at the techninal secu-
rity questions, the mean score was 0.57, with 1 indicating all cor-
rect answers and 0 no correct answer. The standard deviation is
relatively small at 0.27 points. Similar scores are identified for the
software engineering technical questions.
4.2 Illustrative analysis example
Table 2 reports two example vulnerability descriptions for which
treatments have a significant effect on assessment errors for at
least one CVSS metric. We report one vulnerabilities where we ob-
serve negative effects on the error (CVE-2014-3566), and onewhere
we observe positive effects (CVE-2012-0384). Information that ex-
plains the difference is highlighted in bold in the Table. In the fol-
lowing, the correct metric assessment is reported next to the CVE
vulnerability identifier:
CVE-2014-3566 (AC:High, UI:Required). Students that received
the treatment were less likely to err at identifying: (a) conditions
outside of the attacker control (p < 0.10), as the treatment specifies
that “[the] attacker must be able to modify network traffic between
the victim and this web server”, suggesting a man-in-the-middle
condition; (b) the requirement on UI, specifying that the attack is
possible only after “[the victim] has visited a web server” (p < 0.01).
CVE-2012-0384 (PR:Low). The treatment significantly increases
chances of error over PR (p < 0.01). The treatment states that
to trigger the vulnerability “the attacker would need access to the
trusted / internal side of the IOS.”. Any user authenticated in the net-
work would be able to access the interface (i.e. only non-privileged
authentication to the network is required). However, the additional
information that “the vulnerability is post authentication on the ad-
ministrative interface of the Cisco device”, can be misleading in that
the attacker does not need to be logged in the administrative panel,
but only capable of reaching it from the network (in which he/she
must be authenticated).
In our examples, additional information could either aid or hin-
der a correct assessment by, for example, misleading wording of
relevant information (e.g.CVE-2012-0384): in accordance with pre-
vious findings in sw engineering [9, 24], both quantity and quality
of information may affect task execution. Unfortunately, neither
can be a realistic requirement for an informative vulnerability de-
scription as they do not provide a clear guidance on which infor-
mation cues should be provided.
4.3 Tratment effect on assessment error
To identify the effect of the measured information cues we employ
a set of mixed-effect regression analyses. For the model selection
we relied on the Akaike Information Criterion6. The only signifi-
cant student characteristic is security expertise (Esec ). Correlation
between the independent variables is always below 0.2.
We first check for the possible correlation between length of vul-
nerability description (expressed as word counts) and error rates,
and find that neither the length of the original NVD description
nor the length of the treatment text have significant effects on the
6Considered control variables: Z 1 : security expertise of the student; Z 2 : software
engineering expertise; Z 3 :work experience; Z 4 : years of enrollment in a Computer
Science major Z 5 : university courses completed.
observed error.We therefore proceedwith the analysis of the effect
of the information cues.
For our final regression, the regressors are count of information
cues measured in the original NVD description and those added by
the assigned treatmentsT . All variables are standardized. The final
regression equation over the binomial response variable represent-
ing assessment error yˆ = yms,c is:
yˆi = β0 + β1E
sec
i + β2Cues
NVD
i + β3Cues
T
i + us +vc + ϵi
Results are reported in Table 4. A negative, significant coeffi-
cient indicates a decrease in the chances of error. Positive, signif-
icant coefficients indicate an increase in chances of error. Secu-
rity expertise tends to reduce error although it is not a significant
factor for all metrics. Overall, we find consistent estimations for
each information category. In general, information cues on Attack
and Vulnerability type aid the scoring for all metrics. Asset
creates mixed results, whereas Known threat is always counter-
productive. The fixed effects account for about 10% of the overall
variance in themodel across all metrics, with only a few exceptions
in either direction (14% for UI, 3% for C). The inclusion of the ran-
dom effects accounts for in between 22% and 46% of the variance,
indicating a good overall fit.
RQ1: How does information category Asset impact assessment er-
rors? Error rates on A are negatively impacted by this information
category; for example, if the vulnerable asset is a server, service
availability can be likely compromised by an attack. Additionally,
we find that information on Assets increase the error on the AV
metric, albeit the effect is only weakly significant. Some assets (e.g.
a router or a server) may be correlated with AV:Network assess-
ments, whereas in specific cases the attacker may need be locally
authenticated on the asset. We provide two examples of this from
our experiment in the next Section. We reject the null hypothesis
of Hyp. 1 for A and accept the alternative that there is a decrease
in error. We do not reject the null for C,I.
RQ2: How does information category Attack impact assessment
errors? This information category improves accuracy on AV, as it
can clearly indicate the position of the attacker. Similarly, we find
a negative effect on error for AC. For example, aman-in-the-middle
attack suggests a high condition for this metric [12]. For the CVSS
impact triad CIA, information regarding the attack decreases error
for Confidentiality and Integrity. For example, a cache poisoning
attack implies an impact on the integrity of the cached information.
We reject the null hypothesis of Hyp. 2 for AV,AC,C,I and accept the
alternative that there is a decrease in error. We do not reject the
null for A.
RQ3: How does information category Vulnerability type im-
pact assessment errors? For AC, information on the type of vulnera-
bility favours assessment accuracy. For example, specifying that
the vulnerability is caused by insufficient randomness (e.g. of a
hash function) may indicate that the attacker will typically have to
find a collision before actively exploiting the vulnerability. Vulnerability
type also reduces chances of error on UI. For example, a cross-site-
scripting vulnerability typically requires the user to click on a ma-
licious link. The effect on PR is similar: this information cue may
clarify whether some level of privilege is required to launch the
attack. For example, privilege escalation vulnerabilities typically
require some level of authentication. We reject the null hypothesis
of Hyp. 3 for AC,PR,UI, and accept the alternative that there is a
decrease in error.
RQ4: How does information category Threat impact assessment
errors? In general, we find that this information cue increases the
chances of error. From the CVSS specification, the BaseMetric should
only consider information relative to the technical characteristics
of the vulnerability. Hence, the existence of an exploit or of a demon-
strated attack is unnecessary information that need be processed
by the assessor. For example, information on the existence of a
demonstrated attack may increase the error on AC, as previously
discussed (cf. 3.4). Similar considerations can be made for the other
metrics. We reject the null hypothesis of Hyp. 4 for AC,C,A, and ac-
cept the alternative that there is an increase in error. We do not
reject the null for I.
5 DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that ‘baseline’ vulnerability descriptions can
be significantly improved by including additional information. In-
formation of type Attack and Vulnerability type are particu-
larly effective in increasing the accuracy of vulnerability assess-
ment by reducing error on the whole set of Exploitability metrics
(cf. Table 1) AV, AC, UI, PR.
In our sample, additional information on attacker actions sig-
nificantly decrease error on AC, indicating that additional informa-
tion on Attack was missing from the original text. Similarly, the
Attack information added by our treatments also significantly de-
crease the error for C and I. Our results suggest that security ex-
pertise helps interpreting this information (e.g. a ‘cache poisoning’
attack).
The information on Vulnerability type conveyed by stan-
dard vulnerability descriptions seem not to be significantly improved
by our treatment for AC and PR, whereas there is a highly signifi-
cant improvement in assessment accuracy for UI. Information re-
garding the type of vulnerability such as a file-based buffer over-
flow or a cross-site-scripting vulnerability should be included in
vulnerability descriptions. This is again in accordance with the
negative significant coefficient for Esec , indicating that security
expertise is significant in correctly understanding the type of vul-
nerability.
An interesting finding is that Asset contribute in increasing er-
ror on AV. Certain information on Assetmay correlatewith certain
AV values; for example, if the vulnerable asset is a server, AV:Network
assessments may be more likely. For example, 42% of the students
erroneously classified CVE-2014-6271 as AV:Local, likely as the
vulnerability is specified, in the original NVD description, to affect
“GNU Bash through 4.3 [..] [in] situations in which setting the envi-
ronment occurs across a privilege boundary from Bash execution”.
Here the vulnerable asset is clearly the GNU Bash, which may
suggest that the user need be authenticated locally to reach the
vulnerability. However, in the worst case this is possible without
any local access to the environment, as specified in the descrip-
tion: “the vulnerability can be exploited by [..] mod_cgid modules
in the Apache HTTP Server, scripts executed by unspecified DHCP
Table 4: Regression results
Regression results for our equations. p-values for the fixed effects are computed by using Satterthwate’s estimation for degrees of freedom as provided by
the R package lmerTest. Standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. Regression coefficients are reported for the information cues all students received
(as provided in the original NVD description of the vulnerability) and for the additional information cues included in the treatment. All variables are
standardized. The original NVD descriptions do not have any information regarding Known threats, which is therefore only relevant for the provided
treatments. An anova test of variance indicates that the intercepts for students and CVEs significantly vary between subjects and vulnerabilities.
model AV model AC model UI model PR model C model I model A
Fixed effects
(Intercept) -0.804∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -2.035∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗ 0.088 -0.511
(0.203) (0.200) (0.376) (0.331) (0.224) (0.246) (0.312)
Esec -0.088 -0.007 -0.233∗∗ -0.137 -0.190∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.080
(0.081) (0.098) (0.110) (0.128) (0.100) (0.093) (0.095)
Information cues from original description
Assets 0.384∗ 0.097 -0.550 0.246 -0.035 0.314 -0.696∗∗
(0.198) (0.192) (0.383) (0.328) (0.221) (0.232) (0.320)
Attack -0.555∗∗∗ 0.062 0.111 -0.209 -0.013 -0.034 0.388
(0.211) (0.196) (0.386) (0.333) (0.228) (0.238) (0.327)
Vulnerability type 0.085 -0.330∗∗ -0.362 -0.530∗∗∗ 0.169 0.032 -0.150
(0.149) (0.135) (0.228) (0.166) (0.143) (0.139) (0.163)
Additional information cues from treatment
Assets -0.191 0.169 -0.282 -0.054 0.121 -0.069 -0.100
(0.129) (0.123) (0.175) (0.131) (0.113) (0.125) (0.108)
Attack -0.036 -0.280∗∗ -0.238 -0.031 -0.313∗∗∗ -0.202∗ -0.183
(0.116) (0.127) (0.183) (0.139) (0.112) (0.114) (0.120)
Vulnerability type -0.108 -0.067 -0.563∗∗∗ -0.103 -0.015 -0.072 -0.052
(0.098) (0.116) (0.171) (0.125) (0.100) (0.100) (0.112)
Known threats 0.176 0.528∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ -0.206 0.325∗∗∗ 0.017 0.278∗∗
(0.128) (0.138) (0.177) (0.138) (0.121) (0.127) (0.131)
Variance of random intercepts
Student 0.045 0.263 0.101 0.637 0.314 0.210 0.200
CVE 0.464 0.436 1.821 1.473 0.636 0.706 1.400
Pseudo-R2 (Fixed effect) 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09
Pseudo-R2 (Fixed and random eff.) 0.22 0.25 0.46 0.44 0.25 0.26 0.39
Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001; ‘**’ 0.01; ‘*’ 0.05; ‘.’ 0.1.
Hyp. Inf. Cue H0 H1
Reject No reject
Hyp. 1 Assets A C,I Err. Decrease
Hyp. 2 Attack AV,AC,C,I A Err. Decrease
Hyp. 3 Vuln. Type AC,PR,UI - Err. Decrease
Hyp. 4 Known threats AC,C,A I Err. Increase
clients [..]”, which indicates a Network vector for the attack. Sim-
ilarly, in our sample, 89% of the students erroneously categorized
CVE-2012-1516 as AV:Local. The description reports that “it is pos-
sible to manipulate data pointers within the Virtual Machine Exe-
cutable (VMX) process”, which suggests that the user need be lo-
cally authenticated on the machine to access the process. This is
not a condition for AV:Local as the vulnerability can be reached
by the “handler function for RPC commands” [11], a procedure to
send remote commands to a process. Both examples suggest that
a more precise definition of Attacker actions may contribute in
decreasing the effect.
Finally, information on Known threats is regarded by security
experts as of primary importance to assess vulnerability risk [14].
However, we find first evidence that it consistently increases chances
of error, as the CVSS Base metric should only consider technical de-
tails on the vulnerability.
Following Devanbu et al.’s recommendations on the impact of
empirical findings on software practices [8], we further discuss
practical implications of this work.
Implications for vulnerability communication.Our results
suggest that baseline vulnerability descriptions contain only a lim-
ited set of the information that leads to an accurate CVSS assess-
ment. Additional information on Attack, Vulnerability type,
and Assets may result in more informative vulnerability descrip-
tions. Following our results, standards and best practices for vul-
nerability communication, including CVSS itself, may provide guide-
lines for the communication of informative vulnerability descrip-
tions [20]. Our results suggest that inclusion of information of the
Threat category should be discouraged. Further, our results iden-
tify dimensions over which vulnerability information can be auto-
matically categorized and provided to vulnerability assessors.
Implications for software security practices. Our findings
can help practitioners in identifying information that is significant
for a vulnerability assessment over each specific metric [24]. For
example, the assessor performing an evaluation of the AV metric
may look specifically for Attack information. Similar considera-
tions can be made for the other metrics (cf. Table 4). Additionally,
the assessor should deliberately ignore any information on Known
threats, if present. By replicating this work, it could be possible to
build ‘confidence intervals’ around vulnerability assessment that
account for errors in the estimate. These intervals could then be
accounted for when prioritizing vulnerability fixing.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Conclusion validity. To avoid introducing noise in the vulnerabil-
ity descriptions and treatments used in the experiment, all descrip-
tions and treatments have been chosen from the official documen-
tation released by the the First.org standardisation team, used for
official training for the standard.
Internal validity. Results may be confounded by order of treat-
ment or learning effects. As we can not cover all treatment combi-
nations, our experiment design is not full-factorial. However, we
accounted for all combinations of treatments for similar vulnera-
bilities that might confound results. The identification of our key-
words for the measurements of information cues in the vulnerabil-
ity descriptions was performed independently by three authors of
the paper. To minimize chances of bias, the experiment was per-
formed before the final example documentation was publicly re-
leased.
External validity. Following [15] we consider students suitable
subjects for relative performancemeasures. Studentswere informed
that the exercise is not graded. All received the same training on
the CVSS scoring system at the beginning of our experiment. We
controlled for potentially relevant characteristics of our subjects,
including security expertise and work experience.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigate which information cues aid vulnera-
bility assessment by humans. We based our definition of relevant
information on current standards and best practices [20, 29], and
recent research findings by other authors [14, 26]. Our results pro-
vide first indication that, in general, additional information cues on
Asset, Attack, and Vulnerability type on top of the baseline
vulnerability descriptionsmay aid the assessment process,whereas
information cues on Threat hinders it.
An interesting venue for future research is to explicitly consider
the effect of information security knowledge by devising experi-
ments with security professionals. Additionally, this work opens
toward research considering measures of complexity to evaluate
whether there exist boundaries over which the cognitive perfor-
mance of the assessor decays.
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